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Abstract: 
There has been much debate about whether patterns of urbanization in 
sub-Saharan Africa defy the usually accepted links between migration flows 
and economic geographies.  In the 1980s and 1990s African urban 
economies were weak and increasingly informalised.  The livelihoods of the 
majority of urban households became intensely vulnerable.  However the 
most widely accepted narrative was that rural-urban migration remained 
strong and rates of urban growth were unaffected, suggesting that African 
migrants ignored economic signals and that explanations of migrant 
behaviour must primarily be non-economic. A new angle on this debate has 
now arisen: whether urbanization in Africa generates economic growth or 
vice versa.  This has been triggered by the much improved GDP growth 
rates which many African countries have experienced in the 21st century, 
driven in large part by a commodity boom and increased demand for their 
natural resources. This paper seeks to contribute to these debates through 
a detailed analysis of the contrasting experiences of Zimbabwe and Zambia 
from the 1960s to today.  Rates of urbanization waxed and waned in both 
and were evidently affected by national economic development patterns 
which have been highly variable – to a significant extent the experience of 
each country in each decade has been the mirror image of the other.  From 
this it is argued that, as elsewhere in the world, migration flows have been 
strongly influenced by economic opportunity.  The evidence from these 
countries also supports the view that it is economic development that 
drives urbanization, and not the other way round. 
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Introduction 
 
‘a far deeper understanding is needed of what exactly drives aggregate urbanization 
trends in developing and emerging economies. A question being raised is: in such 
economies, does urbanization cause growth or is it the other way round?’  
UN Habitat, State of African Cities Report 2014, p. 19. 
 
This paper describes and analyses trends in urbanization and migration in Zimbabwe and 
Zambia over the past 50 years in order, first, to contribute to debates about the 
relationship between economic growth and urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa and, 
second, to provide insights into trends in urbanization there more broadly.  It is in part a 
response to the central question from the current State of African Cities Report (SoAC) 
quoted above.  
 
The paper outlines key elements of the current debates about African economic growth 
and urbanization before moving on to the empirical analysis of urbanization in Zimbabwe 
and Zambia.  These two countries have been chosen because they provide interesting 
opportunities for comparative analysis. It is hard to think of a similarly alike pairing of 
countries elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa. They are in many ways remarkably 
geographically similar. They are landlocked and they share a border.  They experience 
similar climatic regimes with strongly seasonal and variable climates, and are vulnerable 
to occasional droughts.  Maize is their key staple food product. They were colonised by 
the British.  They have important and longstanding mineral sectors but neither has oil. 
Their populations are the same size: about 13 million. However, as the paper will 
demonstrate, despite their similarities, their experiences have differed to an extraordinary 
extent: in essence they have been mirror images so that when one was urbanizing, the 
other was not. In neither case has there been a steady linear urbanizing trend.  
 
It is helpful to allay some obvious objections about these countries’ similarity before 
proceeding further, for there are also important differences between them.   Their colonial 
histories were significantly different, despite both being under British rule.  Although 
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both were ruled by Rhodes’ British South Africa Company from the 1890s to 19223/24 
under a royal charter, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) then became a conventional colony, 
but Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), with its much larger settler population, chose 
‘responsible self-government’- or rather its white population opted for this.  Over the next 
40 years this meant that the self-interests of the white electorate of Southern Rhodesia 
determined government policies, allowing continued land alienation from the indigenous 
Africa population and drastic urban influx controls, but also the development of 
manufacturing industry and some excellent economic infrastructure (albeit almost 
entirely outside of the reserves set aside for the African rural popuation).  In Northern 
Rhodesia, social and economic developments became more similar to those in other 
colonies, with British commercial interests to the fore and plenty of racist and 
segregationist policies, but indigenous landholdings were now better protected.  The 
crucial outcomes of these different trajectories were that Northern Rhodesia became 
independent Zambia in 1964, in line with a host of other newly independent former 
European colonies, but the ‘self-governing’ whites of Southern Rhodesia refused to 
accept the inevitable, and illegally declared their own ‘independence’ from Britain, whilst 
maintaining (and indeed worsening) racist policies which discriminated against the 
African majority.  This led to a liberation war which eventually brought about 
Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980.  As will be seen, these differences in policy regimes 
and the timing of independence fed into contrasting urbanization and migration patterns 
in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.  
 
African urbanization and economic growth: the debates 
 
During the ‘lost decades’ of the 1980s and 1990s when many sub-Saharan African 
countries experienced long periods of recession and tragic falls in their people’s welfare, 
a debate grew up about whether it was puzzling that rates of rural-urban migration and 
urbanization did not slow.  The idea of ‘urbanization without growth’ developed (eg 
Jamal and Weeks 1993; Fay and Opal 2000).    In fact there was accumulating evidence 
from censuses and surveys that net migration rates to towns and urban growth slowed in 
many African countries (eg see Becker et al 1994, Ferguson 1999; Africapolis undated; 
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Beauchemin and Bocquier 2004; Potts 1995, 2005, 2010, 2012a), so the debate was 
partly based on false premises and the latest SoAC 2014 (UN Habitat 2014) accepts that 
net migration rates did fall.   
 
Very recent African censuses (eg in Mauritania, Ghana, Zambia and Tanzania) show that 
growth rates in some towns have now increased again. This has happened alongside very 
significant improvements in GDP growth.  This  has fed into a new debate about the 
relationship between rising urban populations and economic growth in Africa. An 
important contribution was the 2009 World Development Report which strongly 
emphasised the positive role of urbanization in economic development, because it 
countered the usual anti-urban tenor of most analyses of sub-Saharan Africa.  It was not, 
of course, specifically about Africa but it set out the thesis that the region was under-
urbanized and would benefit economically from faster urbanization, which has become 
part of the new debate.    There are now a range of economic and urban analyses which 
assert either explicitly or implicitly that it is the urbanization that is causing the economic 
growth.   For example, the head of UN Habitat, Joan Clos, wrote in the preface to the 
2010 State of African Cities report that in Africa, ‘Just as the Asian powerhouses, 
Africa stands to benefit from the rapid expansion of its cities. Urbanization is jump-
starting industrialization’ (Clos, 2010, ii).  A frequently cited report on Africa’s fast-
growing economies by the Mckinsey Global Institute (2010) argued that ‘[g]lobal 
businesses cannot afford to ignore the potential….. Africa’s growth acceleration resulted 
from more than a resource boom……. Long-term growth also ill be lifted by ….. 
Africa’s growing labor force, urbanization, and the related rise of middle-class 
consumers’ [emphasis added].  The 2012 African Economic Outlook, which focused on 
youth unemployment, claimed that, ‘the long-term perspective is good……. rapid 
urbanisation provides opportunities for sector development and job creation’  (Africa 
Development Bank, 2012, p11])  Another, earlier analysis on African urbanization, stated 
that, ‘most economists agree that urbanization can precipitate economic development in 
the region’ (Hanson 2007). In 2013 in a presentation on African urbanization Paul Collier 
argued,  
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‘Cities are fundamental to the miracle of productivity because …[they] permit 
scale and specialisation…. The more people you can bring together, the more 
specialisation is possible. And in rough terms, we think that every time you double 
the size of a settlement, globally, you get an increase in productivity per person of 
about 6 per cent. …. So, whatever urban middle class romantics about rural areas 
say to the contrary, dispersed is dumb. …. economic activity takes density.’ 
(Collier, 2014) 
 
Even if we confine a comparative perspective to sub-Saharan Africa, Collier’s 
esssentialist take on the relationship between city size and economic production is 
obviously problematic given, for example, the difference between productivity in 
Johannesburg and Kinshasa.  With reference to urban jobs, he further argued that these 
result ‘from … processes initiated by policies, investments, and decisions of various 
actors’ but again, that ‘[in] my mind, they are a product of density’.   
 
The influence of this approach to African urbanization is evident in the quote at the start 
of the paper.  The very positive presumptions made about how urbanization will lead to 
higher productivity, employment and economic growth draw upon the standard toolbox 
of urban economic geographers – specialization of production and labour, agglomeration 
economies, economies of scale, backward and forward linkages, industrial clustering, 
innovation and so on.  That these characteristics are facilitated by conditions in dense, 
large urban settlements has long been established in geographical literature (eg Bourne 
and Simmons 1978; Lloyd and Dicken 1977; Pacione 1985) and is often the starting point 
for students of urban economic geography.  In recent years these concepts have been 
revisited with renewed interest in the relationships between urbanization and economic 
growth (eg Scott and Storper 2013; Spence et al 2008).   For example, in their recent 
review of urban theory and the nature of cities, Scott and Storper (2013: 6) argue that, 
‘throughout the course of history, urbanization has been fundamentally engendered by a 
complex interaction between economic development, divisions of labor, agglomeration, 
specialization and external commerce’.  The potentially positive links are also 
emphasised by Annez and Buckley (2008: 1) who state that ‘[u]rbanization and growth 
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go together’.  Nonetheless these authors do not suggest that urbanization is, on its own, 
sufficient to drive economic growth.   The links between growth and urbanization are 
seen as two-way. It is also recognized that positive urban economic developments require 
public sector planning and infrastructural investments as otherwise ‘disfunctionalities 
would unquestionably undermine the viability of the city, for market logic alone is 
congenitally incapable of regulating the urban commons in the interests of economic 
efficiency and social wellbeing’ (Scott and Storper, 2013:8). And Annez and Buckley 
(200? : 28] note that ‘[a] sound system of public finance for local public goods does not 
emerge naturally in poor urbanizing countries’ and ‘requires central government support’.  
This is evidently relevant for African urban economies as infrastructure in most African 
cities is poor.  
 
More significantly for this debate, a review of available evidence for the relationships 
between economic growth and urbanization specifically in Africa found it to be very 
mixed.  Four such studies found no link, while three did (Turok and McGranahan 2013).  
Turok (2013) has also shown that while the relationship between levels of GDP per capita 
and urbanization levels in 1985 and 2010 for eight Asian countries was extremely 
positive and unambiguous, this was not true for selected African countries.  He concludes 
that this ‘clearly supports the argument that urbanisation has not been strongly 
associated with economic development in Africa’ (ibid, 152, 154).  However, this 
may well be because the strong variations in annual GDP per capita change  for 
each African country over that period, with weak or even negative growth in the 
1980s and 1990s, and fast growth since 2000, evidently would not be reflected 
by two data points 25 years apart.   
 
One key factor not much emphasised in these studies is the strong impact of global 
competition and the constraints of comparative advantage on the nature of economic 
growth and urban economies in different countries in a liberalized trade environment.  
Asian cities have strongly outcompeted those in Africa (and indeed many in OECD 
countries) for manufacturing and the associated jobs.  Much of the theorising about the 
positive economic aspects of cities relates to this sector with Scott and Storper (2013: 5) 
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stating that it is after the Industrial Revolution that ‘the fundamental relationship between 
economic development and urbanization becomes especially clear’.  Indeed, the SoAC 
2014 Report from which the quotation at the beginning of this paper is taken, goes on to 
note that research by the Asian Development Bank on the correlation between 
urbanization and GDP growth finds that ‘the strongest direction of causality is probably 
from industrialization to urbanization, rather than the reverse’.  This adds another layer to 
the debate, because much of sub-Saharan Africa de-industrialised under the impact of 
trade liberalization at the end of the 20th century and the process has not ended yet for 
some countries. Turok (2013: 147) notes that, today, protecting infant industries in 
African cities is likely to ‘run foul of … WTO rules’.  Much of Africa’s recent economic 
growth comes from stronger commodity exports and mining and thus the role of these in 
urbanization is attracting much interest (ibid; Robbins 2013; Potts 2013a; Bryceson and 
MacKinnon 2012).  Gollin et al (2014: 2), for example, argue that ‘industrialization and 
resource exports are equally plausible sources of urbanization in the developing 
world’ as ‘resource rents are disproportionately spent on urban goods and 
services’ leading to ‘consumption cities’; however, they find these are not as 
‘welfare-improving as production cities’.   
 
The remainder of this paper contributes to these debates about trends in African 
urbanization, migration and economic growth by examining the trajectories of these three 
factors in Zimbabwe and Zambia from the 1960s.   As will be shown, their experience 
strongly supports the position that urbanization is dependent on economic growth (and 
not vice versa), both at the national level and in relation to the trajectories of individual 
settlements. 
 
Urban trends in Zimbabwe and Zambia compared 
 
The following analysis of the past 50 years of census data from Zimbabwe and Zambia 
starts by looking at the broad national patterns as expressed by changes in urbanization 
levels. It then moves on to look more closely at individual towns, using a shift analysis 
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which identifies those which have gained or lost population share relative to the country 
as a whole during different intercensal periods. 
 
The national picture: urbanization and counter-urbanization from the 1960s to today 
 
1960s:     At the beginning of the 1960s censuses were held in both Southern and 
Northern Rhodesia.  Their levels of urbanization were close: 18.4% in Southern Rhodesia 
and 21% in Northern Rhodesia.  By fortunate coincidence both countries held another 
census in 1969 and, as shown in Figure 1, a major gap had emerged in the few 
intervening years.  Southern Rhodesia had actually counter-urbanized slightly during the 
1960s, whilst Zambia (as Northern Rhodesia had now become) had urbanized extremely 
rapidly, adding about a percentage point a year to its urbanization level to reach 29%. 1  
 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE [Changes in level of urbanization] 
 
The explanations for these opposing trajectories lie in a combination of local and global 
factors.  At the beginning of the 1960s, as explained in the introduction, both countries 
were still part of the British Empire, but their political situations were very different.  
From 1953 both were part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, which brought 
together the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland (today’s Malawi) in an economic and political 
grouping.  However, this had been strongly resisted by the African populations of all 
three territories who perceived, correctly, that one objective of the Federation for the 
white settlers was to try to avoid the imposition of elections with universal suffrage 
leading to independence from Britain and, inevitably, black majority governments.  In 
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland it was increasingly clear by the start of the 1960s that 
                                                 
1
 All the data on urban populations and growth rates cited in the text and used in the figures are derived from the 
relevant census reports for the respective countries. Data are never taken from sources like the World Bank or UN 
Habitat as these can be misleading.  All urban figures are taken from the report from the census for the year reported 
and are always cross-checked (eg between national level reports and any regional or provincial reports) to ensure 
publishing errors are weeded out. All growth rates are independently calculated from raw data.  Fortunately both 
Zimbabwe and Zambia are scrupulous about publishing their census data in a reasonably timely fashion (and now 
online) and the author has data sets back to the 1960s for Zambia, and earlier for Zimbabwe.  A similar analysis to this 
one would be very much more difficult for many other African countries due to data issues. 
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this was not going to be possible and the groundwork for eventual elections was being 
laid.  In 1964 both became independent.    
 
For Zambia this meant that a new African government now determined national policies.  
Laws which had constrained rural-urban migration and family migration were relaxed 
and major public investment began to be made in health, education and the bureacracy as 
well as in industry.  Much of this was urban-located. In essence Zambia followed the 
tenets of modernization theory which was the norm at the time, with a central role for the 
government and deliberate investment in social infrastructure and industries, protected 
from foreign competition by tariff barriers. Zambia inherited an economy which was 
heavily dependent on copper mining and exports.  A string of mining towns linked by 
rail, road and energy infrastructure already existed on the Copperbelt: Ndola, Kitwe, 
Chingola, Luanshya, Mufulira, Chililabombwe and Kalalushi.  By 1963 Kitwe’s 
population was 123,000, and Ndola’s 93,000, for example. The 1960s was a boom decade 
for the global economy and the terms of trade for most newly independent African 
countries were quite favourable, especially since oil prices were very low by 
contemporary standards.  Copper prices were strong, and the private mining companies of 
the Copperbelt were highly profitable. Zambia’s copper production increased 7.3% 
annually in the 1960s. These factors combined to create many new urban formal sector 
jobs, which in turn allowed the development of much informal sector work associated 
with the multiplier effects of the new consumption power in Zambia’s cities.   
 
The impact of these developments on rural-urban migration was huge.  In the six years 
between 1963 and the next census in 1969 Zambia’s main towns attracted very large 
numbers of in-migrants, many of whom brought their families with them; female in-
migration increased significantly, urban birth rates shot up, and urban sex ratios, 
previously heavily favouring men, began to even out.  The effects of the burgeoning 
government expenditure were most strongly felt in the capital city, Lusaka, which grew at 
nearly 14% per year, and therefore more than doubled its population from 121,000 to 
262,000.  Net in-migration was also strong to the Copperbelt towns. The level of 
urbanization increased by an astonishing 8%.   Most urban residents were in-migrants 
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rather than urban-born.  Significantly, however, long-established practices, which had 
been encouraged by colonial policies, of maintaining rural links and some rural 
retirement continued.  The lack of viable livelihoods for those not in work, such as the 
old and disabled, affected these decisions, as well as various cultural influences (see Potts 
2010a). 
 
In Southern Rhodesia the situation was very different.  An illegal white settler 
government declared ‘independence’ from Britain in 1965 and proceeded to tighten urban 
influx controls for Africans (Gargett 1977), seriously constraining rates of net in-
migration (Mutambirwa and Potts 1990; Potts 2010).  Family migration was discouraged, 
so sex ratios remained skewed towards men.  International sanctions on the illegal 
government imposed some limitations on economic growth but also, ironically, provided 
strategic enforced protection from global competition for many productive enterprises in 
the urban economy. This was a benefit in the short-term for manufacturing (Stoneman, 
1982; Riddell 1990) which was already stronger in Rhodesia than almost anywhere else 
in sub-Saharan Africa due to its encouragement during the years of white settler self-
government. The new illegal government also provided strong support for strategic 
industries, for example renationalizing the iron and steel industry.   
 
The overall outcomes of these policies was that Rhodesia (as it became in 1965) counter-
urbanized as already noted.  The fall in the urbanization level was small but contrasted 
very strongly with Zambia’s experience, evidently, and indeed with the upward trends of 
rural-urban migration and urbanization across independent sub-Saharan Africa in the 
1960s.  The combined impact on migration and urbanization masks important 
differentiation between racial groups.  There was net in-migration of the already highly 
urbanized white population and their urban share increased from 78.3% to 79.8% during 
this intercensal period.  They accounted for about one quarter of the total urban 
population of Salisbury, the capital city, by 1969. However, the urbanized African 
population fell from 14.5% to 13.9% (Ministry of Finance 1979). 
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1970s:    Zambia’s next census was conducted in 1980 and Zimbabwe’s in 1982, two 
years first after independence in 1980.  Since then both countries have held censuses 
every ten years, which has by no means been common in sub-Saharan Africa, allowing 
continued easy comparisons between them.  Both countries urbanized strongly during the 
1970s: Zambia’s urbanization level increased to 40%, yet again adding a percentage point 
per year, and Zimbabwe’s rose to 26% (nine percentage points over thirteen years).  The 
urban share of Zambia’s population had almost doubled in eighteen years.  Again a 
mixture of local and global economic and political factors influenced these changes.   
 
At the beginning of the 1970s Zambia’s economy remained strong and the copper sector 
highly profitable and the rapid in-migration of the 1960s was maintained.  However in 
1973 the first oil price shock of the decade hit the global economy and the copper price 
plummeted. Zambian economic growth slowed dramatically. Alongside other non-oil 
exporting African countries hit by rising import bills and falling export revenues as the 
global economy slowed, Zambia borrowed on the assumption that this was a temporary 
shift in its terms of trade.  There were also major regional disruptions to cope with.  
Sanctions on Rhodesia led landlocked Zambia’s transport costs to soar as transit routes to 
the sea for its bulky copper exports were severely affected.  More debt was incurred 
building a second railway north to the Tanzanian coast which would  be unaffected by the 
unstable situation in the southern African region.  Finally, the second oil price shock 
came in 1979.  As global recession set in it became evident that the negative shift in the 
terms of trade was going to be of a longterm nature and Zambia’s debts were 
unsupportable.  By the end of the 1970s,  the economy was reeling, urban incomes were 
in decline, the copper mines were reducing their workforce, poverty was increasing, and 
formal employment growth had slowed (Ferguson 1999).  The seeds of a dramatic change 
in Zambia’s urbanization were therefore already germinating by the end of the 1970s.   
   
In Rhodesia, the surge in urbanization occurred because of a shift to rapid net in-
migration.   Partly this was due to refugees from the liberation war, some of whom settled 
informally. Efforts were still made to maintain control through housing policies and by 
far the largest housing project of that decade was built in Chitungwiza, a  huge 
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‘dormitory’ town for Salisbury located in a nearby African reserve in a last ditch attempt 
to displace African urban population growth away from ‘white’ cities.  This is 
functionally part of the capital city and is discussed as such below.  Once independence 
was attained in 1980, all influx controls were dismantled; their enforcement had anyway 
been waning as political change became increasingly inevitable.  Economic migrants who 
had been pent up in African rural areas by the old laws surged into towns and were 
sometimes joined by family members, so sex ratios started to normalise, and urban birth 
rates increased. 
 
1980s:    In the 1980s the paths of urbanization in Zimbabwe and Zambia again diverged, 
as in the 1960s, but now the situations were reversed: Zimbabwe was urbanizing whilst 
Zambia began to counter-urbanize. The fall in Zambia was small (see Figure 1) but of 
great significance. Here was the country which was often touted, at the time, as a beacon 
of modernization in Tropical Africa, with an integrated and complex urban system 
(compared to most other African countries), but now migration had shifted in net terms 
from rural- urban, to urban-rural (Potts 2005). Copper prices remained low and 
production fell by 3.4% per year in the 1980s (Meller and Simpasa 2011).  The buying 
power of Zambia’s exports, already reduced from an index of 100 in 1970 to 38 by 1980, 
had fallen to 13 by 1986 (Jamal and Weeks, 1993, cited in  Ferguson, 1999). Unable to 
pay its debts, it soon came under the auspices of the international financial institutions 
which began to force the government to impose austerity measures and structural 
adjustment programmes, thus shifting the country away from state-led development 
towards the standard neo-liberal set of economic policies.  These waxed and waned in the 
1980s as the government of the time (a one-party state) sometimes resisted and 
backtracked.  Nonetheless the rises in urban poverty which had already set in by the late 
1970s continued.  Riots broke out in towns as food costs rose. The relative attractiveness 
of livelihoods in urban areas fell below those in some rural areas, as the rural-uban 
income gap dwindled (Potts 1995).  More and more people began to find they could not 
afford to live in town as their incomes could not cover their costs. 
 
Things were very different in Zimbabwe in the 1980s and its urbanization level rose a 
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further 4.6%.  Having arrived fifteen to twenty years late to ‘independence’, the new 
African majority government embarked on a state-led modernization path, similar to that 
practised by newly independent African countries from Senegal to Tanzania.  It remained 
essentially capitalist in its economic character (if socialist in its rhetoric) but the previous 
white settler governments had been strongly directive and their protectionist policies 
were maintained.  The inherited economy had eventually been weakened by sanctions 
and the liberation war but was very diverse and integrated by African standards, with iron 
and steel and textile industries, and strong interlinkages between agricultural and 
industrial sectors (Stoneman 1981). The government also poured money into health and 
education, as had other governments when newly independent, and had some remarkable 
successes in these areas at first. Thus whilst Zambia’s infant mortality rates rose by about 
a quarter in the 1980s, Zimbabwe’s fell by nearly a half.  Urban formal employment 
growth was sufficient to encourage much net in-migration, including many family 
members. Minimum wages were introduced and enforced, leading to job losses in 
agriculture, mining and domestic services, but many mainly urban-based jobs fared 
reasonably well.  Manufacturing employment grew at 2.9% per year from 1980 to 1990, 
electricity and water 2.6%, finance and distribution at 3.5%, and hotel and catering at 
3.6% (Chitiga 2004). By the end of the 1980s non-traditional manufactured exports were 
growing strongly (Stoneman 1989).  Poverty levels in towns were reducing.  Family 
migration and the expected length of stay for  migrants in town increased; nonetheless 
most migrants in Harare (formerly Salisbury) still expected to ‘retire’ to rural areas due to 
the lack of urban safety nets and many rural-urban links were maintained, increasing 
household livelihood resilience (Potts 2010a).   
 
1990s:  In the 1990s Zambia continued to counter-urbanize and Zimbabwe to urbanize.  
By 2000 Zambia’s level was 35% and Zimbabwe’s 33.6%, so at this point their levels 
were again almost the same, as they had been at the beginning of the 1960s. However 
their trajectories had obviously been very different.   
 
For Zambia the underlying causes were basically ‘more of the same’.  The economy was 
liberalised more consistently, under a new government.  Urban labour markets became 
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highly informal; there were more retrenchments at the copper mines, in the public sector 
and uncompetitive industries; and urban poverty worsened.  Migration data in the 2000 
census report showed that during the 1990s net migration rates (per thousand) were +2.8 
into rural areas, and –4.7 out of urban areas.2  The evidence for strengthening circular 
migration was increasingly being picked up in qualitative surveys as well (eg Ferguson 
1990; Purbrick 1990). 
 
In Zimbabwe there were quite dramatic shifts in various demographic factors in the 
1990s.  Fertility levels were falling, and death rates were rising.  Emigration became an 
important influence on population change.  The 2002 census reported that the growth of 
the national population had fallen very significantly from an annual  rate of 3.3% in the 
1980s to 1.1%.3  The urbanization level increased by 3%, but this was slower than the 
rise in the previous decade of 4.6%.  Over the decade there was net in-migration to towns 
but their growth rates were much lower than they were in the 1980s: Harare’s was 75% 
lower, for example.  Furthermore, migration data for the year before the census, and birth 
and death rate data, indicated that many urban areas, including the largest, were 
beginning to lose population share by the end of the intercensal period: net migration 
rates had turned negative (Potts 2008). This fitted the predictions of survey data on 
migrants to Harare in 1994 and 2001 which found that the propensity to leave the city 
was increasing sharply (Potts 2010a). The migration changes were linked to very 
significant economic changes.  At the end of 1991 the country embarked on a structural 
adjustment programme which very swiftly undermined many urban-located productive 
enterprises previously protected from international competition.  The public sector was 
also cut back. There were mass formal job losses and Zimbabwe’s towns, where informal 
work had been fairly insignificant for livelihoods compared to most of sub-Saharan 
                                                 
2
 There are evidently other demographic issues at work influencing rural versus urban population change in Zambia but 
careful analysis of fertility, mortality and HIV/AIDS data has shown that the shifts between the rural and urban 
population share described here mainly accounted for by migration (see Potts 2006). Fox (2014) has argued that the 
changes are more due to an ‘urban penalty’ whereby urban mortality outcomes have been worse than rural but this 
cannot be correct as it was not the case in the 1980s and 1990s. Although it has become so, marginally, for some 
indices in the 2000s, obviously this cannot explain the earlier patterns, and anyway the country was re-urbanizing by 
the 2000s so the tragic impact on the urban population has been outweighed by the effects of net in-migration. In any 
case the net migration data in the censuses are clear on this point. 
3
 Although there was much political argument about this figure, in fact it fitted with a range of other demographic 
trends and indices and is regarded as reasonable (see Potts 2008 for a detailed analysis). 
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Africa, began rapidly to informalise (Mhone 1995).  Real urban incomes fell. Rural-urban 
linkages were strengthening to counter urban vulnerabilities (Mutambirwa and Potts 
1990).  There were increasingly regular strikes (Dansereau 1997). 
 
Zimbabwe’s urban and migration patterns for this decade were playing out against a 
backdrop of increasing political turmoil which needs to be briefly outlined as they were 
of such significance for economic outcomes.  There had been slow land reform since 
1980 to address the most difficult legacy of its history of white settler rule: extreme 
inequalities in the division of land between whites and blacks (Kinsey 1999).  As rural 
and urban livelihoods weakened in the 1990s, this issue came sharply to the fore.  
Pressure from war veterans for better pensions led to a calamitous budget in 1997, when 
the Zimbabwean dollar collapsed.  Threats to expropriate land without compensation 
began, and donor support to wane.  Economic management abandoned any conventional 
developmental model such as modernization or neo-liberalism, and had slid into crisis 
management by the end of the 1990s.  In 2000 the ruling party, ZANU (PF), lost a 
referendum and only held on to power at an election through violence.  Land 
expropriation began in earnest, accompanied by violence, and the country stopped paying 
its debts. It was soon cut off from most international finance except for humanitarian aid.  
The impact on rural and urban livelihoods was drastic, and is the key explanation for the 
emigration. This was occurring from both rural and urban areas. 
 
2000s:   The next census rounds showed that yet again Zimbabwe and Zambia were 
experiencing contrasting patterns of urbanization but this time it was Zimbabwe that was 
counter-urbanizing, and Zambia that was now (re)-urbanizing.   
 
By 2010 Zambia’s urbanization level was back to about where it had been in 1980. The 
main causes were the re-establishment of some key global economic conditions of the 
1960s and early 1970s: high copper prices driven by a strong global economy.  This time 
the main source of demand was the Far East (particularly China) rather than western 
countries.  Zambia’s GDP growth rate soared from about 2003, the mines started to re-
hire and some new mines opened.  In 1978 there had been 62,222 employees in mining 
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most of whom would have been in the formal sector. By 2004 there were only 19,900 
(Matenga, 2010 cited in Evans 2014).   However, by 2008 there were  62,082 formal 
mining employees (Republic of Zambia 2011) and in 2012 this had risen further to 
74,254.4 
 
In Zimbabwe economic conditions up to 2008 were nothing short of disastrous, and 
although there has been some normalization since, the urban economy has remained 
weak and unstable (Chitiyo and Kibble 2014). By the census in 2012 its urbanization 
level had fallen 1% to 32.6%.  National population growth remained similar to the 1990s 
averaging 1.2% per year, but the urban population grew at just 0.6% per year, well below 
the rate of natural increase (discussed later), so net out-migration was occurring to rural 
Zimbabwe and to other countries. Cut off from international finance the government 
printed money, leading to some of the highest levels of inflation ever recorded in the 
world, reaching billions of per cent by the end of 2008 when a degree of normality 
returned after the Zimbabwean dollar was abandoned.  Food security in both rural and 
urban areas was in crisis for much of the decade.  Formal sector pay became almost 
meaningless in relation to urban living costs for most of the time, since inflation 
destroyed buying power almost as soon as pay increases were announced.  By 2004 the 
primary inputs by real value into most urban livelihoods were sourced from beyond the 
city (Potts 2011): a combination of agricultural crops, livestock, and gold panning. A 
government campaign against urban informality in 2005 made it even harder to live in 
towns; although informal work gradually restarted (or the cities would truly have 
collapsed), hundreds of thousands had lost their houses.  Emigration continued, providing 
crucial remittance incomes for many, although many migrants were impermanent and 
involved in cross border trading, going back and forth between Zimbabwe and South 
Africa, or Botswana, or even Mozambique and Zambia.  The discovery of very 
significant diamond resources in this decade provided a crucial lifeline for corrupt elites, 
and fed into many other livelihoods, but had few direct impacts on urbanization.   
 
                                                 
4
 The 2010/11 Zambian income and earning report, using different survey methods, records only 53,326 in this sector 
all of whom would have been formal workers. 
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To summarise the paper so far: Zimbabwe and Zambia since the 1960s have had directly 
contrasting urbanization experiences.  Both experienced decades in which they have 
counter-urbanized.  In each decade the urban outcomes have been caused by broad 
economic trends and influences, as well as some country-specific policies: thus 
urbanization has followed economic growth except when draconian restrictions on 
migration have been in place.  However the national urbanization data only tell us so 
much; they mask many variations within the countries’ urban networks.  The next 
sections turn to these patterns which provide further insights into the links between 
economic patterns and urbanization. 
 
Deconstructing Zimbabwe and Zambia’s urban patterns 
Urban shift analysis 
A shift analysis of urbanization takes the national growth rates for each intercensal period 
and compares these with those for individual towns.  It shows which towns grew faster or 
slower than the country’s population overall, and thus which were increasing or losing 
relative population share.  This is a helpful approach, because rapid growth rates in 
African towns of say, 3% per year (which would double the population in 23 years) are 
sometimes assumed to mean that urbanization fuelled by net rural-urban migration is 
occurring, when in reality very little real change is occurring in rural:urban shares simply 
because the national population is growing at much the same rate.  It is  a simple 
approach which is easy to do with available data but is indicative only, since natural 
increase rates may vary somewhat between towns and of course between rural and urban 
areas.  However natural increase remains higher in African towns than suggested by their 
fertility rates, which are lower now than in rural areas5, because towns often have high 
birth rates as they tend to have a larger proportion of people in their fertile years than 
rural areas. Also their death rates tend to be lower than rural ones. Growth rates similar 
to, or even less than, national rates do not mean there has been no in-migration either – it 
simply means that net in-migration has been limited.   
 
                                                 
5
 There are regular Demographic Health Surveys held in most African countries.  These show that in 1994 Zimbabwe 
urban fertility rates were 3.1 and rural rates were 4.9. In 2011 the rates had changed very little and stood at 3.1 and 4.8.  
In Zambia in 1992 the urban rate was 4.8 and the rural rate 7.1. These had fallen by 2014 to 3.7 and 6.6.  
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FIGURES 2, 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Figures 2 and 3 show the extent to which the ten largest urban areas at the last census in 
Zimbabwe and Zambia were gaining or losing population share over the past fifty years.  
Taking Zambia first: the most obvious issue is how the counter-urbanization of the 1980s 
and 1990s was because urban growth on the Copperbelt fell below the national level; the 
fall was not spread evenly across urban areas.   The towns involved were Ndola, Kitwe, 
Chingola, Mufulira and Luanshya.  Kabwe, another mining town (but not a copper 
producer) was similarly affected. Also clearly depicted is how the period of net out-
migration for most copper towns began in the 1970s, when copper prices fell so sharply.  
Kabwe, by contrast, continued to grow strongly in that decade.  Very significantly, all 
these mining towns continued losing population share in the 2000s (except Kitwe 
although its growth was very little faster than Zambia’s), even as the country’s economic 
growth rate sharply improved and the country overall began to re-urbanize.   
 
On the other hand, as shown, Lusaka has consistently grown at rates above Zambia’s.  Its 
relative growth did fall right back to just 1% faster in the 1990s, when liberalizing 
economic reforms were at their height; in the same decade the mining towns were losing 
population share fastest as the shift analysis shows.  However the gap increased to +2% 
from 2000-2010, although the rate of in-migration is less than it was in the 1970s and 
1980s.   
 
The experience of the other three Zambian towns in Figure 2 has been variable. Space 
precludes detailed analysis but it is worth noting that their recent growth rates all 
exceeded the national growth rate.  Chipata’s growth is associated with its role as a 
transport and trading post on the border with Malawi, and Kasama’s growth in the 1970s 
was because the, then new, Tazara railway passed through it. 
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Turning to Zimbabwe (Figure 3), there has also been notable variation in population 
growth between towns.  As shown, only the largest towns (the Harare agglomeration,6 
Bulawayo, Mutare, Gweru and KweKwe) experienced periods when they lost population 
share in the 1960s and 2000s, causing the counter-urbanization during those decades.   In 
the 1960s influx controls were more vigorously enforced in larger centres.  The strong net 
in-migration for most of the large towns in the 1970s as influx controls dwindled, and 
again during the positive economic phase of the 1980s is clearly depicted.  The shift to 
lower rates of net in-migration in the 1990s is apparent.  Finally, it can be seen that the 
shift to counter-urbanization in the last intercensal period was caused by very slow 
growth in the largest towns which lost population share: the Harare agglomeration, 
Bulawayo, Mutare, Gweru and KweKwe.  Harare on its own (ie disaggregated from the 
agglomeration) grew at only 0.3% per year. Bulawayo’s growth rate was –0.3% so it lost 
population in absolute, as well as relative terms. 
 
While the shift analysis identifies the towns worst affected in Zimbabwe, in fact the 
situation in these towns has been even worse than it suggests.  A shift analysis, like a 
census, can only account for internal population change between urban and rural areas, 
and between towns. Yet many migrants from towns (and rural areas) have been going to 
other countries, rather than Zimbabwean destinations.  My rough estimate of net 
emigration from 2002 to 2012 is 774,000, based on the census totals and the expected 
additions from natural increase rates.7  Since emigrants are not recorded by the census, 
the internal migration patterns recorded in the census tell only part of the urban economic 
story.  The published data are only for inter-provincial migration, which limits the 
analysis to Bulawayo and the Harare agglomeration, where the urban populations make 
                                                 
6
 Harare is best analysed in terms of three urban areas within Harare province, which operate functionally as one town 
since nearly all the employment is in Harare. These are Harare, Epworth (a former informal settlement) and 
Chitungwiza.  Housing shortages in Harare and high housing costs have led also to the development of another 
associated residential area to the east of Harare Province at Ruwa.  Its population in 2012 was 56,678, compared to 
22,155 in 2002, making it the fastest growing ‘town’ in the country at 9.8% per year.  Nonetheless, even if Ruwa is 
added on to the Harare agglomeration, it makes little difference to its growth rate and it was still losing population 
share.  The same is true if the so-called Harare Western Suburbs (Zvimba District) are added in, which are adjacent to 
Harare’s to the west. This area has complex political origins, and is only partly ‘urban’. 
7
 The estimate uses an annual growth rate of 1.75%,  an average of the natural increase rates recorded in 2002 and 
2012, which yields an expected 2012 population of 13,835,210. The recorded population was only 13,061,239.  The 
estimate obviously depends on the growth rate used: a 2.2% rate (the figure for 2011-2012) nearly doubles the deficit to 
1,398,170.  This would definitely be an overestimate. Much would depend on the timing and speed of the fall of adult 
death rates as the HIV incidence decreased, and in child mortality rates as the economy normalised after 2008. 
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up all, or  nearly all, of their province’s population. Lifetime migration data, which record 
the current residence of people born elsewhere, shows negative shifts in both cities.  The 
net gain to Harare from people born elsewhere accounted for 22% of its population in 
2002 but  only 17% in 2012. For Bulawayo the respective figures were 19% and 16%. 
Intercensal migration data demonstrate clearly how net in-migration to both cities has 
fallen compared to the 1990s (Table 1), when it was already reducing; it also shows how 
dominant circular migration has been with much movement in and out (see Potts 2010b). 
Both towns nonetheless experienced net gains in population from internal migration: 
Harare’s population was about 5% higher in 2012 than it would otherwise have been, 
equivalent to about 100,00 people; Bulawayo gained about 26,000.  However, as the shift 
analysis already identified both cities as losing population share, we know that there has 
been net out-migration overall so the balance must be accounted for by emigrants.  As 
with the national population, it is possible to calculate rough ‘city deficits’ using 
provincial natural increase data from the censuses (see Table 2).  These calculations 
suggest net emigration from Harare of about 303,000 and from Bulawayo of 123,000.  In 
sum, the analysis suggests net out-migration from Harare in the intercensal period of 
about 200,00 people, equivalent to about 10% of its 2012 population; and around 100,000 
from Bulawayo, 15% of its population. Triangulation between different demographic data 
thus provides insights into the depth of the impact of Zimbabwe’s urban economic crisis 
on urbanization and migration patterns.  
 
TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
The fact that the four smallest urban centres depicted in Figure 2 gained population share 
in the terrible economic condition of the last intercensal period is significant.  First, this 
points to a relative lack of resilience of urban livelihoods in the larger centres compared 
to smaller towns.  In other words, the larger the town, the more vulnerable its people have 
been during the dramatic economic downturn. The falls in formal sector employment and 
real incomes in urban Zimbabwe which began in the 1990s and worsened dramatically in 
the 2000s brought about major changes in migrants’ perceptions of the economic 
advantages of towns.  The lack of economic safety nets in towns was crucial in their 
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judgements.  This was very evident from research in Harare in 2001, when most migrants 
surveyed felt that their standards of living, compared to their previous place of residence, 
had either not improved or had actually declined, and most said they planned to leave the 
city in the short to medium term (Potts 2010).  During a real economic crisis, the big 
problems in the larger centres, relative to smaller towns, are higher costs of living, 
particularly for housing and transport to work, and  the greater difficulty of defraying 
these by various livelihood adaptations. In smaller towns it is easier to walk to work, 
planning regulations on informality are less vigorously enforced, and food security is 
much more easily addressed by urban agriculture within or just beyond the urban 
boundaries (which are obviously nearer in small towns), or by links to nearby rural areas 
from which many migrants originate.  Not only has  this been demonstrated in Zimbabwe 
by a detailed study of people’s views in the small town of Rusape (Andersson 2002) 
which had a population of around 30,000 in 2012,8 but it was also evident from the 
migrant surveys in Harare as some respondents intended  to move to smaller towns for 
these sorts of reasons (Potts 2010a).  Food security was a very serious problem in urban 
Zimbabwe up until at least 2008; in 2004 a national urban vulnerability assessment found 
it to be as bad as in the rural areas but almost all international humanitarian food 
programmes only operated in rural areas. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
How do these patterns of urbanization and migration in Zambia and Zimbabwe inform 
the debates outlined in the introduction on the ‘chicken and egg’ question about 
economic growth and urbanization in African countries, and the rationality of migrants? 
First, the waxing and waning of urbanization in both countries, for which the proximate 
cause is variations in the net rates of in-migration to towns, surely demonstrates beyond 
any doubt that these processes do not occur ‘in the absence of economic growth’ in 
Africa.  Migration rates go up when employment is being generated but are not sustained 
in the face of strong negative changes in urban economies, incomes and conditions; they 
                                                 
8
 Rusape’s average growth rate 2000-2012 was 2.9% per year, about two and half times that of the national population. 
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change in logical ways and according to the basic precepts of standard neo-classical 
migration theory.  Second, both when looking at overall changes in the urban population 
share, and when boring down into the data and disaggregating by town, most shifts in in-
migration rates and urban population growth can be explicitly linked to an economic 
factor; exceptions are due to specific political influences.  In other words, positive (or 
negative) economic changes which either create (or undermine) livelihoods occur before 
migration changes.  Put another way, if in-migration and the establishment of densely 
settled, large urban populations were enough to create self-sustaining economic growth, 
there would have been no ‘waning’ of urbanization levels or of the populations of 
individual large towns in either country.  The same point could be argued about sub-
Saharan African countries more generally: why did the periods of very strong 
urbanization established in the early decades of independence not establish sustained 
economic growth trends across the continent if urbanization itself triggers economic 
development? 
 
Some urban geographers might regard the central debate here as a ‘straw man’: an 
academic position artificially constructed and easily proven wrong for the sake of making 
an analysis seem more relevant. The post-industrial landscape of the USA and Europe is 
littered with towns (eg Baltimore, Detroit, Liverpool) which have ‘waned’ as the 
geography of global economic forces has rendered them relatively uncompetitive: merely 
being large and dense, facilitating agglomeration economies, was not enough to maintain 
their economic growth (Beauregard 2009; Haase 2012).   Mining towns have always been 
prone to ups and downs, or even disappearing (‘ghost’ towns), depending on the price of 
the mineral. However, as the introduction to this paper demonstrated, there really is a 
conviction amongst some analysts that contemporary urbanization in Africa can self-
generate economic growth.  There is something of a parallel here with the ideas promoted 
by Florida (2002) that promoting the growth of certain types of labour (young creative 
people) in struggling cities can regenerate their economies. The idea of the economic 
growth following the urban people is similar, although the African debate is much 
broader brush.  However Florida’s policies have been very effectively criticised as 
ineffectual by Peck (2005).   
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The earlier debate about African urbanization in the 1980s and 1990s was different from 
the current one: the issue was not whether urbanization and rapid in-migration could 
generate urban economic growth but why the obvious weakness of urban economies did 
not deter rapid in-migration.  It has been interesting to watch how one debate somehow 
segued into the other without much reflection on the fundamentally different 
understandings of the key ‘factors’ (urbanization, migration, economic production) 
involved.  Misunderstandings of the complexities of migration flows have played some 
part.  Knowing that rural-urban migration is occurring is enough for there to be a 
presumption, as in the two first SoAC reports, for example, that rapid urbanization is 
occurring.  The points that out-migration back to rural areas or to other countries occurs, 
that both migration flows vary in logical ways according to the relative strengths of 
livelihoods, and that net migration can end up being quite small or occasionally negative, 
are missed.  The case studies of Zambia and Zimbabwe exemplify the significance of a 
broader understanding. Another problematic over-simplification is to assume that if urban 
net in-migration is at all positive, and there is any net gain in population share of a town 
or range of towns, even when economic conditions have been trending down, then that 
disproves that migration flows are affected by economic signals.  Lusaka, for example, 
has always experienced net in-migration. Yet well conducted migration surveys always 
show that there are some flows for which the proximate causes are non-economic (eg to 
join family members; attend higher education; obtain medical care), or where there is a 
desperate need for cash to support family members elsewhere, or where personal (eg 
divorce, disputes) or structural (eg war) disasters push people to towns.  Put differently, 
small rises in urbanization levels do not prove that there is some sort of new urban 
‘model’ whereby migration flows are virtually divorced from a country’s economic 
geography. When rates of net in-migration, and  shifts in the share of national population, 
are analysed over long periods of time as in the shift analysis conducted for this paper, 
rather than looking at a particular year or short time period, the underlying role of 
economic factors becomes clear.   
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Finally, although the discussion above has focused on economic issues, the cases of both 
Zambia and Zimbabwe show very clearly the significance of political factors and regional 
geography for understanding urban trajectories, as well as exogenous economic forces, 
none of which are much recognized in the debates this paper mainly addresses.  The 
nature and strength of implementation of policies on influx control and land have been 
fundamental influences in the past and continue to shape urbanization patterns, and both 
reflect the nature of the state and the significance of white settlers.  Zambia’s economic 
decline in the 1970s was greatly exacerbated by being landlocked and trying to comply 
with economic sanctions on its neighour which was also its transit route state.  All these 
factors need to be combined to have a true understanding of the urban narratives at the 
core of this paper.  The migration trajectories depicted are nonetheless clear: they shift as 
urban economies and labour markets have strengthened or weakened and those shifts are 
always embedded in broader global forces, from international sanctions on Rhodesia 
during UDI, to shifts in the terms of trade, to the imposition of neoliberal policy 
conditions in aid packages and advice, to the rise of China. 
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Table 1: Inter-censal Inter-provincial Migration in Zimbabwe 1992-2002 and 2002-2012 
 
Province and 
census date 
Census 
population 
>10 yrs 
a
 
As % of population aged >10 years at census 
Resident at 
census and 
previous 
census 
Intercensal 
in-migrants  
Intercensal 
out-migrants 
 
Net gain 
from 
intercensal 
migration  
Harare 2002 1,397,596 75 34 -23 11 
Harare 2012 1,568,529 67 33 -29 5 
      
Bulawayo 2002 514,524 75 30 -24 6 
Bulawayo 2012 490,881 69 31 -27 4 
Source: calculated and compiled from data in 2002 and 2012 census tables on intercensal migration rates; CSO 
(2004a), ZimStat (n.d.) 
Notes: a. to compare populations between one census and the previous one, it is necessary to exclude those under ten 
years of age at the current census as they had not been born at the previous one; to retain comparability the matrices 
used to generate inter-censal flows also exclude the under-tens at the earlier census.  The Zimbabwean statistical office 
also excludes from the population used those who reported that their place of enumeration had not been their main 
place of usual residence during the 12 months before that census. 
b. Percentages may not add exactly due to rounding 
 
 
Table 2: Demographic indices: Zimbabwe and Harare and Bulawayo Provinces  
 
Population index Zimbabwe Harare 
province 
a
 
Bulawayo 
province 
b
 
Population 1992 (‘000s) 10,412 1,537 622 
Population 2002 (‘000s) 11,632 1,896 677 
Population 2012 (‘000s) 13,061 2,123 653 
Crude birth rate 2001-02 30.3 30.5 27 
Crude birth rate 2011-12 31.9 33.3 27.3 
Crude death rate 2001-02 17.2 10.6 13.9 
Crude death rate 2011-12 10.2 7.7 9.3 
Natural increase 2001-02  % 1.3 2.0 1.3 
Natural increase 2011-12  % 2.2 2.6 1.8 
AAGR  1992-2002 % 1.1 2.1 0.8 
AAGR  2002-2012 % 1.2 1.1 -0.3 
 Source: compiled or calculated from data in CSO (2004), CSO (nd.), ZimStat (n.d)  
a. Harare province mainly comprised three separately designated urban areas in 2002: Harare, Chitungwiza and 
Epworth.  The provincial boundaries were extended by 2012 largely for electoral gerrymandering reasons, which 
increased its population (and apparent growth rate); but the annual growth rate between 2002 and 2012 of the original 
urban conglomeration was 0.7%.  
b. Bulawayo province comprises Bulawayo city; the two are synonymous 
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Figure 1: Changes in level of urbanization in Zambia and Zimbabwe 1960s to 2010/12  
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Zambia's ten largest towns 1960s to 2010
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Urban growth rates relative to national population growth for 
Zimbabwe's ten largest towns 1960s to 2012
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